ABSTRACT Peer-to-peer sharing economy such as Uber and Airbnb has played an essential role in the global economy. Different from the traditional rental economy, sharing economy does not guarantee standard services for its users and the service quality is largely monitored by the users via their evaluations/feedbacks of the service. However, in the existing sharing economy markets, users are not incentivized to offer their true feedbacks to the platforms, and they are often incentivized to misreport. Therefore, our goal is to design reward mechanisms that can incentivize the users to report they are true feedbacks. The existing work has considered the problem when the feedbacks are binary (e.g., good or bad), but the feedbacks in practice are usually n-ary. Therefore, we propose a novel framework to design reward mechanisms which incentivize users to report their feedbacks truthfully when the feedbacks are n-ary. This is achieved by designing a proper reward scheme such that reporting feedback truthfully is a Nash equilibrium given that the cost of the platform is minimized. We form the problem as a linear program, which takes incentivizing users to report truthfully as constraints and minimizes the cost to the platform. The linear program is solved via its dual problem. Under a proper condition, we get a special solution structure of the linear program. This special structure allows us to derive a general solution form which does not need to solve the linear program in a brute force manner and the computation complexity is significantly reduced.
I. INTRODUCTION
Peer-to-peer sharing economy such as Uber and Airbnb allows small suppliers to compete with traditional merchants. Service quality is an essential part of a sharing economy platform's competitiveness, and high-quality services give the platform steady and healthy development. The platform cannot set standards for services/goods because they are often idle resources offered by individuals. The users' evaluation/feedback after experiencing a service is a good reflection of the service quality. Thus the platform usually monitors the service quality via the users' feedback to improve the services (e.g., awarding high-quality services and punishing low-quality services). However, there is no guarantee that users will give their truthful feedbacks. If a rational user can get a better reward from misreporting feedbacks, she
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Ziyan Wu. will do so [1] , [2] . On the other hand, there is no way to verify whether a user's feedback is truthful or not. This problem is called information elicitation without verification (IEWV) [3] . The platform needs certain strategies to encourage users to report feedbacks truthfully in an IEWV problem. Moreover, most of the platforms adopt an n-ary star rating system [4] . However, these rating systems do not incentivize their users to rate the service honestly and the platform cannot verify whether their ratings are truthful.
In this paper, we propose a general framework to design a truthful feedback elicitation mechanism for the n-ary answer scenario such as the n-ary rating systems. A set of users are assumed to experience the same service, and each of them perceives a private signal of the service's quality. The quality signal is also n-ary. The elicitation mechanism requires each user to report her observation of the service's quality. The mechanism rewards a user according to the similarity between the user's report and the reports of the others.
Those rewards exploit the correlation between the private signal observed by a user and the user's beliefs regarding the reports of the others.
Obviously, the platform could give a huge amount of reward for users to report their observations truthfully, but this will cost the platform a lot. Ideally, the platform would like to minimize the reward paid to users under the condition that they are still incentivized to report their observations truthfully. The solution consists of a reward for each user under each observation report profile. The solution can be computed via a linear program. In the linear program, the variables are the rewards for each report profile (the number of report profiles is finite), the constraints guarantee that reporting observations truthfully is always better than misreporting, and the objective is to minimize the total expected reward expenses. The idea of using linear program to search for the reward mechanism belongs to the field called automated mechanism design [5] .
To solve this linear program, we transfer it into its dual problem. To solve the dual problem, we identify a special solution form under a proper condition, which helps us to construct a common solution structure of the primal program. This common solution structure applies to all settings (with different sizes of the feedback type) and the computation is much faster than solving the primal program directly. This is also the key contribution of the paper.
A special case of our setting has been investigated by Jurca and Faltings [6] . They have considered the setting where users' answer is binary, e.g., good or bad. They also applied linear program and used the primal-dual method to find a fairly complex reward mechanism such that users are incentivized to report feedback truthfully and the total expected read expenses is minimized. However, their solution for binary-setting cannot be directly extended to our n-ary setting.
Similar to our setting, Miller et al. have also considered n-ary answer scenario with the same objective [7] . They have developed a reward mechanism to incentivize users to report truthfully by a peer-prediction method [8] - [10] . Their mechanism rewards a user by comparing the user's report to one specific user's report (known as reference report). The mechanism guarantees that a user cannot benefit from an incorrect report when other users report truthfully. However, under their mechanism, users could easily collude to gain a higher reward because the mechanism chooses only one reference report for the reward decision. Our reward mechanism and also Jurca and Faltings' reward mechanism choose all the others' reports as reference to define the rewards for each user.
Other methods such as scoring rules [11] - [13] and reputation systems [14] - [17] are also widely used to encourage truthful feedbacks. These mechanisms based on scoring rules needs the true outcome as the ground truth to compare to then reward correct prediction of the outcome. But in many cases, there is no way to obtain the ground truth [11] , [18] .
In reputation mechanism, although there is no needs of ground truth, it suffers from the low incentive for providing rating [19] - [23] and bias towards positive rating [24] , [25] .
Different from those methods mentioned above, our contributions advance the state of the art in the following ways:
• We extended the binary feedback setting in [6] to a general n-ary setting and proposed a general truthful feedback elicitation reward mechanism which contains the mechanism proposed in [6] .
• Under a mild restriction on the users' observation, we found a common structure for the reward mechanism, which applies to any number of users and any number of feedback types.
• The common solution is computationally faster than solving the linear program directly. Let N be the number of users and M be the number of feedback types (as M is normally bounded in practice, we can treat it as a constant), the complexity to directly solve the linear program to find the reward mechanism is O(N log N ), but the solution based on our general structure can be computed in O(N ).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II defines the setting and properties of the feedback elicitation mechanism. Section III describes the truthful feedback elicitation mechanism via linear program and proves its properties. At the same time, a running example is also given to illustrate our method in Section III. We conclude and discuss future work in Section IV.
II. THE MODEL
We consider a peer-to-peer sharing economy platform, where services are offered by the crowd, such as taxi services offered by Uber drivers. A set of agents (or users) is assumed to experience the same service, and the quality of the service remains fixed. We model the quality of service as the service type, denoted by a finite set = {1, . . . , M } (i.e. there are M different quality signals). We assume that there are N rational agents experiencing the same service. All agents share a common probability distribution of the type of the service which is denoted as (.). For all θ ∈ , (θ ) is the prior probability that the service is of type θ, and θ ∈ (.) = 1.
After experiencing the service, every agent i perceived a private quality observation about the service which is denoted as o i . The observation o i depends on the service type offered and the user herself. Let Pr[o i |θ ] be the probability that agent i's observation is o i when the service type is θ . Hence, for each agent i we define an observation probability matrix P i , where the l-th row, k-th column of P i is defined by p l,k i :
which is the probability agent i observes l when the service type is k. Formally, for each agent i, we define her observation probability matrix P i as follows:
Definition 1: The observation probability matrix of agent i is defined as
l,θ i = 1 for all θ ∈ . In practice, each agent i's observation probability matrix P i can be different. To simplify the notations, we assume that all agents' observation probability matrices are the same. Our results can be generalized to the general case when the assumption is removed. We discuss it in section III.D. The same probability matrix is represented by P as follows, which is also the common knowledge to the platform:
The elicitation mechanism requires every agent to report her observation. However, agents are rational and not forced to report the truth. For agent i, given her observation o i , let s i be her reporting strategy, S is the set of all feasible s i . Let s −i be the strategy profile of all agents except i. Let s i be the strategy that agent i always reports honestly, i.e. s i (o) = o for all o ∈ , and s −i be the strategy profile that all the other agents report honestly. Similarly, letŝ i be the strategy that agent i always report her observations falsely, i.e.ŝ i ∈ S\{s i }.
Our goal is to design an elicitation mechanism for the platform to elicit agents' truthful reports. Without any proper reward scheme, agents are not incentivised to do so. Therefore, we will design a reward schema such that reporting their truthful observations is a Nash equilibrium. In other words, for each agent i, if the others report truthfully, then it is the best response for i to report truthfully. Let r i be agent i's report under strategy s i , r −i be the report profile of all agents except i under strategy profile s −i . The elicitation mechanism is defined as follows.
Definition 2: Given all agents' observation report profile (r i , r −i ), the elicitation mechanism is a set of reward func-
the amount paid to agent i when i's report is r i ∈ and the other agents' reports are r
Given report profiles r −i , r −i ∈ ( ) N −1 , let r −i (o) and r −i (o) be the number of reports of type o ∈ in these profiles. We say r −i and r −i are equivalent if and only if for
For example, there are 4 agents experiencing the same service and the service type is binary which is represented by 0 and 1.
The report profile of all agents except i can be
. Hence we present each class of equivalent report profiles containing
. We also refer to n as the reference reports of agent i. We use N to denote the set of all feasible profile classes n = (n 1 , n 2 , · · · , n M ) where n o ≥ 0 for all o ∈ , and
Similarly, we can define agent i's reference observations The expected reward of agent i depends on the distribution of the reference reports and i's observations. If the other agents report honestly, the distribution of the reference reports can be computed from the prior beliefs. The probability that the reference reports submitted by the other N-1 agents is n when agent i's observes o i is:
where Pr[ n|θ ] is the conditional probability that agent i's reference reports is n when service type is θ , and Pr[θ |o i ] is the conditional probability that the service type is θ when i observed o i . Pr[ n|θ ] is derived from the multinomial probability distribution function and Pr[θ |o i ] can be compute from Bayes' Law:
Given agent i's reference observations x and strategy profile s −i , let µ[s −i ]( n, x) be the probability that the other N −1 agents will report n. We can define agent i's expected reward as follows.
Definition 3: Given all agents except i's reporting strategy profile s −i , agent i's reporting strategy s i and her observation o i , the expected reward for agent i is defined as:
If we assume all agents except i truthfully report their observations, then i's expected reward can be simplified to
In the rest of the paper, we will design proper reward functions such that all agents are incentivized to report their observations truthfully. Before that, we will run a simple example of the setting to further comprehend the above definitions.
Example: Given the above definitions, let us consider a simple example with service type space = {1, 2, 3} and N = 4 agents who have experienced the service. The probability distribution of the service types are (1) = 0.1, (2) = 0.2 and (3) = 0.7. Let the observation probability matrix P for all agents to be the following:
where, for example, when the service type is 1, each agent i has a probability of 0.8 to observe 1, a probability of 0.2 to observe type 2, and a probability of 0 to observe type 3.
Then we can compute the probability for agent i to observe each type o i , e.g., Pr
× (θ ) = 0.24. We can also compute the conditional probability that the service type is θ when agent i's observation is o i , e.g., Pr[θ
= 0.3333. Given the service type θ , assume all agents except i have observed type 1 and they all tell the truth (i.e. n = (3, 0, 0)). Then we can get the probability Pr[ n|θ ] that the other agents report n when the service type is θ . For example, Pr[ n = (3, 0, 0)|θ 3 3! = 0.512. Finally, we get the probability that the reference reports n is (3, 0, 0) when
III. HONEST FEEDBACK ELICITATION MECHANISM A. MECHANISM STATEMENT
In this section, following the work of Jurca [6] , we propose a general framework to design an honest elicitation mechanism for our general settings. The goal is to incentivize agents to truthfully report their observations and also minimize the platform's reward cost. The approach is to model the problem as a linear program. In this linear program, the constraints guarantee that reporting observations truthfully is always better than misreporting, and the objective is to minimize the total expected reward expenses. Then we transfer this complex linear program into its dual problem and obtain a common solution structure of the primal program. Moreover, the computational complexity is significantly reduced.
We say an elicitation mechanism is incentive compatible if reporting honestly is a dominant strategy for each agent when the others also report honestly, i.e., reporting honestly is a Nash equilibrium.
Definition 4: An elicitation mechanism is incentivecompatible (IC) if
In the following, we will show how to design an incentive-compatible elicitation mechanism. Given an elicitation mechanism (the reward functions defined in Definition 2), for agent i, if the others report truthfully, agent i's expected reward (defined in Definition 3) can be simplified to:
Hence, the incentive-compatibility constraints for agent i become:
These IC constraints indicate that agent i will maximize her reward if she reports honestly. However, it doesn't say how much it is better than misreporting. Therefore, in practice, we also set a reward margin > 0 to guarantee that the reward difference between honest reporting and lying is at least . Margin is a parameter of the mechanism which can vary between applications. By guaranteeing this reward margin and incentive-compatibility constraints, we get the following constraints:
∀ŝ i ∈ S\{s i }, ∀o i ∈ Jurca and Faltings [6] have studied a special case of our setting where the service quality has only two types, i.e. | | = 2, and they have found reward functions minimizing cost and incentivizing honest reporting. Inspired by their approach, we construct an incentive-compatible elicitation mechanism to minimize the cost of the mechanism for our general settings.
Following the expected reward defined for agent i under observation o i in Definition 3, the overall expected reward paid to agent i is calculated by summing the expected reward under all possible observations o i , denoted by E(V (s i , s −i )):
where Pr[o i ] is defined by Equation (3), Pr[ n|o i ] is defined by Equation (1) and τ i (o i , n) is the reward paid to agent i when i reports o i and the others report n.
To minimize the rewards paid to agents, we will need to minimize E(V (s i , s −i )) for each agent i. We assume that the reward functions do not discriminate between agents, i.e.
) for agent i is equivalent to minimizing the total cost of the platform. This can be formed as the following linear program.
LP: Following the example given in Section II, where the service quality has 3 types and 4 agents experience the service, we can construct a linear program to both incentivize agents to report honestly and minimize the reward cost.
LP-Example
We can use standard methods to solve the above LP, but the computational complexity grows exponentially with respect to the number of types M . More importantly, it is hard to identify a general form of the solution. Therefore we introduce the dual problem, which will help us to discover a beautiful general solution form of the LP under a proper condition. Especially, it suits for any number of types and any number of agents, and we do not need to solve the complex linear program when the type space is increasing and the computational complexity is growing exponentially. We convert the above LP to its dual problem as following:
We
use D(o) k to represent the k-th row of D(o) and D(o) k,l to represent the entry in the k-th row and j-th column of D(o). D(o) consists of the coefficients of τ i (o, n) under each reference reports when agent i's report is o among all constraints. D(o) k,l is the coefficient of
can be expressed in Table 1 .
TABLE 1. The value of each entry of D(o).
We can obtain each submatrix D(o) directly according to Table 1 Applying this method to our example, we set the non-negative constant margin as 1. So = (1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1 ) and y = (y 1 , y 2 , y 3 , y 4 , y 5 , y 6 ) T . Then we obtain the constraints' coefficients matrix of the dual problem directly according to 
where n = (n 1 , n 2 , n 3 ), n 1 + n 2 + n 3 = N − 1 = 3 and
= 10 and dim( n) is 3. As for 3 types, the reference report n has 10 cases in total: 
C. PROPER SIMPLIFICATION
For further simplification and obtaining the general solution, we import proper condition to transform DP into DP'. Definition 5: For ∀o ∈ and ∀o = o ∈ , ∀ n ∈ N \{ n o }, if we have:
where
. We say that the observation probability matrix P and service's probability distribution (.) are proper. In our example, when the observation probability matrix P and service's probability distribution (θ ) are proper, we have
where ∀ n ∈ N \{ n o } and o ∈ . We explain Proposition 1 in detail by the DP-Example. The 30 constraints of DP-Example can be divided into 3 groups according to i's report o. Each group has 10 constraints. The first group consists of the constraints that o is 1: . The coefficients of y 3 and y 5 are negative only when they are in the first constraints group so that increasing y 3 and y 5 won't contradict the second and third group of constraints. Thus we can optimize this solution by increasing y 3 and y 5 until this solution satisfy
Current solution is optimal solution. The other 27 constraints hold strict inequality under proper condition at the same time.
According to Proposition 1, it's not difficult to find that the constraints of DP are equivalent to D * y = P * where
]). Thus we have Theorem 1:
Theorem 1: When P and (.) are proper, DP is equivalent to DP', which is defined as: DP': where D consists of D (1) 
Thus the optimal solution y * of DP' is also the optimal solution of DP.
Before we give the general form of y * in Theorem 2, we introduce Proposition 2 to explain the relationship between DP and LP. 
Proof: The proof directly follows Proposition 1 and Complementary Slackness [26] Theorem 2: When P and (θ) are proper, the incentivecompatible reward functions minimizing the expected reward for an honest agent i is:
where B jo is the algebraic cofactor of B in j-th row and o-th column.
Proof: The essential of our method is simplifying the primal problem according to the information obtained from its dual problem. From Theorem 1 we obtain the optimal solution y * of DP by solving DP and we have dual variables y l 1 , · · · , y l o , · · · , y l M are greater than zero. According to Proposition 2 we know that the l 1 -th, · · · , l o -th, · · · , l M -th primal constraints must be equalities and the primal variables are all zero except for τ (1, n 1 ), . . . , τ (o, n o ) , . . . , τ (M , n M ). Thus the primal linear program becomes linear equations whose coefficient matrix is B and the size of B is M × M . Matrix B is a square matrix and each row has one positive entry and one negative entry. By solving these linear equations we finally obtained the general form of τ stated in Theorem 2. The optimal solution consists of all τ under each observation report profile. Thus the optimal solution can also be considered as a reward matrix with the size of M × K in which row subscript represented agent i's report and column subscript represented reference reports, i.e., the entry in the first row and the first column is τ (1, n 1 ) . This optimal reward matrix only has one non-zero entry in each row which imply that an agent will be rewarded only if her report agrees with all her reference reporters.
The matrix B only has 2 non-zero elements in each row. We will discuss how we obtain the matrix B directly from the information given by DP'.
When service has M types, the LP problem totally has M × (M − 1) constraints which can be divided into M groups by report and each group has M − 1 constraints. After solving the DP', we can know which M constraints in LP hold equality. Suppose the l-th dual variable is nonzero, then we have l-th constraint in LP holds equality and we can transform the index number l into a coordinate (u l , v l ) (as we mentioned in section III.B), where u l tells which group (we divide the constraints in LP into M groups by report o i ) the l-th constraint belongs to and v l tells which constraint it is in that group. Thus the row vector of matrix B which corresponds to the l-th constrain in LP can be obtained directly by applying the law shown in below.
The process of our method is shown in Figure 2 . Proof: According to the simplex method [27] we know that the worst case complexity of solving LP directly for one agent is O(log M 
when we treat M as a constant, the worst case complexity of traditional method is O (N log N ) . Meanwhile, the worst case complexity of solving each DP' is O(log M In practice, the number of service's type usually very small, most of the platform adopt 5 stars rating system which means M = 5. We can treat it as a constant. Thus the computational complexity reduces significantly with respect to the number of agents according to our method. Now let's consider our example, each group of constraints in DP-Example has one active constraint when P and (θ ) are proper and we can transform the DP-Example into the DP'-Example as shown in Figure 3 . DP'-Example: Pr[ n|3] reach the minimum when n = (0, 0, 3). It shows the observation probability matrix P and service's probability distribution (.) in our example are proper. Thus we have τ i (1, n 1 ), τ i (2, n 2 ), τ i (3, n 3 ) are non-zero and the other rewards are 0. Then we need to calculate the optimal solution of DP'-Example to find which constraints holds equalities among the LP's constraints: Here y 2 , y 3 and y 6 are not zero which tells us the 2nd, 3rd and 6th constraint in the LP-Example problem hold equalities. As b u l ,v l mentioned above, we can transform these index into a coordinate, which means these index can be represented as (1, 2), (2, 1) and (3, 2 
Then we can get the analytical solution by using the general reward equation in Theorem 2: is obtained by the equation as shown at the top of next page. where n 1 = (3, 0, 0), n 2 = (0, 3, 0), n 3 = (0, 0, 3) and θ ∈ .
By these three equations and Pr[ n|o i ], we can get the reward when the reference report is n 1 , n 2 and n 3 , and the reward for other reference reports' is zero. The reward in this mechanism will be: 
The above table shows the reward function τ i . The elicitation mechanism incentivizes agents to report truthfully through those reward functions. Moreover, we can verify that our analytical solution is the same with the numerical solution obtained by solving the LP-Example problem directly. However, the time complexity is significantly reduced, and the solution is extendable to other settings when N and M do not change.
D. REMOVING IDENTICAL ASSUMPTION
As mentioned earlier, we assume that all agents' observation probability matrix are the same. It's for a better illustration VOLUME 7, 2019 (1)). Given the same P i , we can formalize the computational process of Pr [ n|θ ] with the help of multinomial probability. When we remove this identical assumption, it only changes the system's input and won't change the kernel properties of incentive − compatible and budget minimizing. And it won't change the method for solving the LP problem, our proof and the general form of our optimal solution. Thus, our conclusion still establishes when the identical assumption removed.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
We propose a novel framework to deal with the n-ary feedback elicitation problem for the peer-to-peer sharing economy platform. The goal is to design a mechanism to incentivize users to report their feedbacks to the platform truthfully. This is achieved by rewarding them for reporting truthfully, but at the same time minimizing the reward cost to the platform. We formalize the design problem into a linear program and identified a common reward structure by utilising its dual problem and a proper condition on users' observation probability. The common reward structure applies to any settings and it significantly reduces the computational cost to search for the new reward mechanism when the setting changes.
Considering the situation where users could collude is an interesting future work, which was investigated by Jurca and Faltings [6] under the binary setting. If users collude with each other, the mechanism may not have power to incentive users to be truthful. In other words, the collusion-users may choose any strategy which can maximize their expected rewards, regardless of their true observations. Although, it becomes very challenging for users to collude under our mechanism (different from the peer-predication mechanism [7] , where two users could collude to gain a higher utility), it is still theoretically worth to considering the elicitation mechanism to be collusion-resistant. Most of his researches are on artificial intelligence (especially multi-agent systems) and algorithmic game theory (especially mechanism design and its applications in the sharing economy). VOLUME 7, 2019 
